



U.S. Department of Justice

Immigration and Naturalization Service

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PUBLIC COPY

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
425 Eye Street N.W.
ULLB, 3rd Floor
Washington, D.C. 20536

File:

Office: CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

Date: **FEB 28 2003**

IN RE: Applicant:

Application:

Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under
Section 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8
U.S.C. § 1182(i)

IN BEHALF OF APPLICANT: SELF-REPRESENTED

**identifying data deleted to
prevent clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy**

INSTRUCTIONS:


This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Service where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. *Id.*

Any motion must be filed with the office that originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.7.

FOR THE ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER,
EXAMINATIONS


Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Chicago, Illinois, and is now before the Associate Commissioner for Examinations on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who was found to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for having sought to procure admission into the United States by fraud or willful misrepresentation. The applicant is married to a naturalized citizen of the United States and is the beneficiary of an approved petition for alien relative. She seeks the above waiver in order to remain in the United States and reside with her spouse and child.

The district director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the application accordingly.

On appeal, the applicant asserts that she entered the United States without inspection by walking across the border at Tijuana Mexico and that she then flew from California to Chicago. She indicates that when boarding the airplane in California, she presented a passport that she had purchased that did not belong to her. The applicant also states that her spouse would suffer if she were required to depart the United States, as she would be forced to take their young son with her to Mexico. She states that her spouse would suffer financially and that his income is insufficient to support her and their son in Mexico. No evidence to support the applicant's assertions was submitted on appeal.

The record reflects that at her adjustment of status interview on July 10, 2002, while under oath, the applicant stated that she entered the United States in 1992 by flying from Tijuana, Mexico to Chicago, Illinois. When asked what documents she presented to the immigration officer at the airport, she stated that she presented someone else's passport that she had purchased in Mexico for \$300.00.

Section 212(a) of the Act states:

CLASSES OF ALIENS INELIGIBLE FOR VISAS OR ADMISSION.-
Except as otherwise provided in this Act, aliens who are inadmissible under the following paragraphs are ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United States:

* * *

(6) ILLEGAL ENTRANTS AND IMMIGRATION VIOLATORS.-

* * *

(C) MISREPRESENTATION.-

(i) IN GENERAL.-Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

Section 212(i) of the Act states:

ADMISSION OF IMMIGRANT INADMISSIBLE FOR FRAUD OR WILLFUL MISREPRESENTATION OF MATERIAL FACT.-

(1) The Attorney General may, in the discretion of the Attorney General, waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son, or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

(2) No court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision or action of the Attorney General regarding a waiver under paragraph (1).

Sections 212(a)(6)(C) and 212(i) of the Act were amended by IIRIRA. There is no longer any alternative provision for waiver of a section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) violation due to passage of time. In the absence of explicit statutory direction, an applicant's eligibility is determined under the statute in effect at the time his or her application is finally considered. See *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560 (BIA 1999).

If an amendment makes the statute more restrictive after the application is filed, the eligibility is determined under the terms of the amendment. Conversely, if the amendment makes the statute more generous, the application must be considered by more generous terms. *Matter of George and Lopez-Alvarez*, 11 I&N Dec. 419 (BIA 1965); *Matter of Leveque*, 12 I&N Dec. 633 (BIA 1968).

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that a waiver of the bar to admission resulting from section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying family member. Although extreme hardship is a requirement for section 212(i) relief, once established, it is

but one favorable discretionary factor to be considered. See *Matter of Mendez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, *supra*, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) stipulated that the factors deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act include, but are not limited to, the following: the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and finally, significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

The applicant and her spouse, also a native of Mexico who naturalized as a citizen of the United States in August 2000, were married in September 2000. The couple has one child together, a son born in the United States in June 1999.

On appeal, the applicant submits a statement from her spouse asserting that he needs the applicant in the United States to help raise his son and that the applicant's absence would affect the financial and future plans of his family. He states that if his son left the United States with the applicant, he (the spouse) would suffer because he could not provide the child with the father figure a son needs, and that it would be a financial burden to provide income for his family in Mexico. The spouse further asserts that if his son were to remain in the United States without the applicant, he could not provide adequate child care as it would be very expensive and he could not afford to pay the expenses on his present salary. He concludes that he wants his son to remain in the United States in order to obtain a good education and that his son needs his mother with him.

The court held in *INS v. Jong Ha Wang*, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship. The common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. See *Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1991).

The uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported. See *Shooshtary v. INS*, 39 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 1994). In *Silverman v. Rogers*, 437 F.2d 102 (1st Cir. 1970), the court stated that, "even assuming that the Federal Government had no right either to prevent a marriage or destroy it, we believe that here it has done nothing more than to say that the

residence of one of the marriage partners may not be in the United States."

In *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), the court stated that "extreme hardship" is hardship that is unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation.

A review of the documentation in the record, when considered in its totality, reflects that the applicant has failed to show that her spouse (the only qualifying relative in this matter) would suffer extreme hardship over and above the normal social and economic disruptions involved in the removal of a family member. Hardship to the applicant herself or the couple's child is not a consideration in section 212(i) proceedings. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether she merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application of waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. See *Matter of T-S-Y-*, 7 I&N Dec. 582 (BIA 1957). Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

